August 19, 2024

Roosevelt and Churchill Meet on 1943 War Strategy

Finest Hour 200, Fourth Quarter 2022

Page 40

By Fred Glueckstein

Fred Glueckstein is author of Sir Winston Churchill: Published Articles by a Churchillian (2021).

The Casablanca Conference was held in Anfa, a suburb of Casablanca, French Morocco from 14 to 24 January 1943. Its objective was to plan the Allied strategy for the European theater during the next phase of the Second World War. The idea for the conference began with a proposal put to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in late 1942 by President Franklin Roosevelt, who felt that as soon as the Allies had driven the Germans out of Tunisia in North Africa, which was imminent, there should be a meeting between the military leaders of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States.

The President explained to Churchill that he believed such a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs could best put together recommendations about how to proceed with the prosecution of the war and that such a meeting could be held in Cairo or Moscow. Each Allied leader would be represented by a small group of personnel meeting very secretly. Roosevelt said he would probably send Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, to head the American group, but presumed that all services should be represented. Finally, the President told Churchill that the conclusions of the conference would of course have to be approved by both of them and by Joseph Stalin. Roosevelt asked Churchill to let him know as soon as possible what he thought of the proposal.¹

Churchill replied the same day under the name Former Naval Person: “I entirely agree in principle that there should be a conference with the Russians, but I doubt very much whether a conference between officers on general war policy, apart from some special point, would be of much value.”² Churchill added: “Only at a meeting between principals will results be achieved. What about proposing it for January? By that time Africa should be cleared and the great battle in South Russia decided.”³

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Stalin Declines

Roosevelt agreed that the only satisfactory way of coming to the vital strategic conclusions that the military situation required was for him, Churchill, and Stalin to meet personally. The President then sent the proposal to the Soviet leader. Stalin replied to Roosevelt and Churchill on 6 December 1942, telling them that he welcomed the idea of a meeting in order to craft a mutually agreed upon strategy. To his great regret, however, he felt unable at that time to leave the Soviet Union. Stalin explained that in Stalingrad his soldiers were keeping a large group of the German troops surrounded, and he hoped to annihilate them completely.⁴

Stalin asked whether it would not be possible to discuss these problems by way of correspondence as long as there was no chance of arranging a meeting. Since this was not considered a viable alternative, Roosevelt sent Stalin another invitation. On 14 December, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Churchill: “Dear Winston, I have not had an answer to my second invitation to our Uncle Joe, but, on the assumption that he will again decline, I think that in spite of it you and I should get together, as there are things which can be definitely determined only by you and me in confidence with our Staff people.”⁵ Churchill agreed.

Plans Evolve

Afterwards, Roosevelt sent Churchill a message further elaborating on his proposal. The President thought that he and Churchill should plan a meeting at once with their respective military staffs. He suggested they meet in Africa about 15 January. Roosevelt thought there was a satisfactory and safe place just north of Casablanca.

The President thought it would be wise for some of the military men to precede the political leaders by a few days in order to start formulating recommendations. Roosevelt believed it would take four or five days for him and Churchill together to take care of all of their business and asked the Prime Minister to let him know what he thought.⁶ Churchill agreed with Roosevelt’s plans and suggested SYMBOL as the code name for the conference.

Roosevelt brought with him to Casablanca Gen. Marshall; Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Navy; and Lieut. Gen. H. H. Arnold, commanding the United States Army Air Forces. Churchill was accompanied by Adm. Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord; Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Casablanca

Churchill, Roosevelt, and their Chiefs of Staff stayed at the US Army’s Anfa Camp, a former tourist hotel in the suburb of Anfa, outside Casablanca. Around the hotel were a number of extremely comfortable villas, which were reserved for the President and the Prime Minster. The entire enclave was wired in and closely guarded by American troops.

Churchill and his team arrived on 12 January 1943, two days before the President, and stayed at the Villa Mirador. In the interim, the Prime Minister took walks on the rocks and the beach with Adm. Pound and the other Chiefs of Staff.

While on the beach, Churchill recalled the Allied landings that had recently taken place there as part of Operation TORCH: “Wonderful waves rolling in, enormous clouds of foam, made one marvel that anyone could have got ashore at the landing. There was not one calm day. Waves fifteen feet high were roaring up terrible rocks. No wonder so many landing craft and ships’ boats were turned over with all their men.”⁷

Recommendations

Roosevelt arrived on the afternoon of 14 January. The conference formally began and continued for ten days until 23 January, when the two Allied leaders were presented with a final report on “The Conduct of the War in 1943.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff submitted a number of recommendations. These included focusing on the logistical requirements of making the defeat of the U-boats the uppermost priority (see page 14). The Soviet forces should also be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that could be transported to Russia.

Offensive operations in the European theatre would be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943. The focus in the Mediterranean would be the invasion of Sicily. This would make more secure the Mediterranean line of communication, divert German pressure from the Russian front, and bring direct pressure on Italy. It could also create a situation in which Turkey might be enlisted as an active ally.

Looking elsewhere, the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended that Britain be used as a base for the heaviest possible strategic air offensive against Germany; such limited offensive operations as would be practicable with the amphibious forces available; and the assembly of the strongest possible force in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as the German resistance was weakened to the required extent.⁸ In other words, there would be no cross channel invasion in 1943, as some Americans desired but which the British had strongly opposed.

“The Conduct of the War in 1943” also reviewed operations in the other war theatres. It called for the operations in the Pacific and Far East to continue, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, and for the full-scale offensive against Japan to begin as soon as Germany was defeated. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, those operations had to be kept within such limits that would not jeopardize the capacity of the Allies to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

Finally, the Chiefs of Staff also recommended that, subject to the overall plan, preparations should be made for the recapture of Burma beginning in 1943 and for operations against the Marshall and Caroline islands, if time and resources allowed, without prejudice to Burma.⁹

Unconditional Surrender

On 24 January, an official communiqué was released formally announcing the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.¹⁰ At a press conference held that day, Churchill was surprised to hear Roosevelt say “we would enforce ‘unconditional surrender’ upon our enemies.” Churchill wrote: “It was natural to suppose that the agreed communiqué had superseded anything said in conversation. General Ismay, who knew exactly how my mind was working from day to day, was also present at all the discussions of the Chiefs of Staff when the communiqué was prepared, [and] was also surprised.”¹¹

There was no mention of “unconditional surrender” in the communiqué that had been submitted to the War Cabinet, which had approved it. Roosevelt later explained to his principal adviser Harry Hopkins how the phrase came about: “We had so much trouble getting those two French generals together I thought to myself that this was as difficult as arranging the meeting of Grant and Lee—and then suddenly the Press Conference was on, and Winston and I had had no time to prepare for it, and the thought popped into my mind that they had called Grant “Old Unconditional Surrender,” and the next thing I knew I had said it.”¹²

Churchill understood that the words “unconditional surrender” raised problems: “There is a school of thought in both England and America, which argues that the phrase prolonged the war and played into the dictators’ hands by driving their peoples and army to desperation. I do not myself agree with this,” he wrote.¹³

At the Guildhall on 30 June 1943, Churchill said: “We, the United Nations, demand from the Nazi, fascist, and Japanese tyrannies unconditional surrender. By this we mean that their will-power to resist must be completely broken, and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy. It also means that we must take all those far-sighted measures which are necessary to prevent the world from being again convulsed, wrecked, and blackened by their calculated plots and ferocious aggressions….It does not mean, and it can never mean, that we are to stain our victorious arms by inhumanity or by mere lust of vengeance, or that we do not plan a world in which all branches of the human family may look forward to what the American Declaration of Independence finely calls ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’”¹⁴ Roosevelt made a similar speech clarifying the phrase on 24 December 1943.

The French Connection

In addition to the Anglo American leaders, the Casablanca conference included the co-presidents of the French Committee of National Liberation: Gen. Charles de Gaulle and Gen. Henri Giraud. Each French general led an opposing faction within the French resistance. Roosevelt and Churchill hoped to bring together the two rivals and their competing factions.

De Gaulle and Giraud played minor roles at the Conference and did not participate in the military planning. The hope to bring the two men and their competing factions together failed. At the end of the press conference, the President suggested that de Gaulle and Giraud shake hands before all the reporters and photographers. Although de Gaulle at first refused, he eventually agreed to shake hands with Giraud; it did little, however, to resolve the animosity of the two.

Marrakesh

During his “Wilderness” years, Churchill had spent the winter of 1935–36 in Morocco on a painting holiday. While in Marrakesh, located west of the foothills of the Atlas Mountains, Churchill was awed by the contrast of the arid country and mountain backdrop. On 30 December 1935, he wrote Clementine:

This is a wonderful place, and the hotel one of the best I have ever used. I have an excellent bedroom and bathroom, with a large balcony twelve feet deep, looking out on a truly remarkable panorama over the tops of orange trees and olives, and the houses and ramparts of the native Marrakech, and like a great wall to the westward the snowclad range of the Atlas mountains— some of them are nearly fourteen thousand feet high. The light at dawn and sunset upon the snows, even at sixty miles distance, is as good as any snowscape I have ever seen. It is five hours to the ridge of the Atlas and they say you then look down over an immense area, first a great tropical valley, then another range of mountains, and beyond all the Sahara desert.¹⁵

While in Marrakesh, Churchill was inspired to paint some of his finest watercolors. He later described the desert oasis as “the Paris of the Sahara” and “simply the nicest place on Earth to spend an afternoon.”

As the Casablanca Conference ended, Churchill wanted to take the President to visit his favorite Moroccan city. As Roosevelt prepared to depart, Churchill said to him, “You cannot come all this way to North Africa without seeing Marrakesh. Let us spend two days there. I must be with you when you see the sunset on the snows of the Atlas Mountains.”¹⁶

Churchill worked on Harry Hopkins to have the President agree, and it worked. On 23 January, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their entourages drove 150 miles across the desert to Marrakesh. That evening, the two Allied leaders watched the glow of the sunset on the snow-capped Atlas mountains. Speaking softly, Churchill remarked that it was “the most lovely sight in the world.”

In Marrakesh, Churchill and Roosevelt stayed at the luxurious Hotel La Mamounia opposite the Koutoubia Mosque, or Kutubiyya Mosque. Designed in 1922 by architects Henri Prost and Antoine Marchisio, the hotel combined the Moroccan architectural tradition with the very latest in Art Deco design and decoration. While at the hotel, Churchill painted the scene, his only painting during the Second World War, and presented it to President Roosevelt as a gift. In 2021, the canvas sold at auction for more than eleven million dollars, by far the highest price ever paid for a Churchill painting.

In terms of historical importance, the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca decided Anglo American strategy for 1943 and introduced the policy of unconditional surrender. Equally important, perhaps, is that their wonderful trip to Marrakesh further enhanced their friendship, a friendship that still had to make the vital decisions about 1944 and 1945.

Endnotes

1. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate, (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 594.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 595. Churchill refers to the Battle of Stalingrad. See page 34.

4. Ibid., p. 597.

5. Ibid., pp. 598–99.

6. Ibid., p. 600.

7. Ibid., p. 605.

8. Ibid., p. 620.

9. Ibid., pp. 619–20.

10. See “The Official Communique,” The New York Times, 27 January 1943, p. 1.

11. Churchill, p. 615.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 614.

14. Ibid., p. 616.

15. “Churchill’s World—Hotel La Mamounia, Marrakech, Morocco,” Finest Hour, Autumn 2000, No. 108, p. 20.

16. Churchill, p. 621.