August 19, 2024

Finest Hour 200, Fourth Quarter 2022

Page 47

Review by Joe Oliver

Joe Oliver is a freelance writer currently working on a book about Winston Churchill’s life after 1945.

Alan I. Saltman, No Peace with Hitler: Why Churchill Chose to Fight WWII Alone Rather Than Negotiate with Germany, Hobart, 2022, 784 pages, £38/$52. ISBN 979–8985479423

Whatever the other consequences, Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Nazi Germany has spawned no shortage of literature. Churchill’s authorised biographer Martin Gilbert began his career with The Appeasers, and Churchill’s role opposing first appeasement and then a negotiated peace has been extensively explored. For instance John Lukacs’ Five Days in May, Nicholas Shakespeare’s Six Minutes in May, and David Owen’s Cabinet’s Finest Hour all focus on crucial events in 1940.

Alan I. Saltman’s No Peace with Hitler diverges from such studies (apart from eschewing a timescale in the title) by examining Churchill’s opposition to negotiating with Hitler in a broader context, combing his long previous career for clues. Churchill, a lover of historical parallels, would likely have enjoyed this method, which follows his famous recollection of becoming Prime Minister: “I felt as if I were walking with destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial.”

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Saltman certainly embraces a longue durée approach, devoting the first eight chapters to events before the 1930s, and acknowledging this “potentially involves trillions of facts.” Remembering Arthur Balfour describing Churchill’s The World Crisis as “Winston’s autobiography disguised as a history of the universe,” we could accuse No Peace with Hitler of being a full biography of Churchill disguised as a study of British policy towards Nazi Germany.

Seeing the decision to fight on in 1940 in the context of Churchill’s long career certainly throws up interesting parallels. To take one example, few studies of appeasement would take time to consider whether Churchill’s attitude was influenced by memories of 1922, when Turkish forces under Atatürk threatened to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula. Churchill, who must by then have had Gallipoli’s geography etched in his psyche, demanded the Cabinet resist this, whilst his colleague and future bête noire Stanley Baldwin argued the Turks had a right to reclaim their historic territory.

Churchill’s prescience also stands out (as Violet Bonham Carter commented, “Demons seem to whisper to him”) with a 1925 memo considering how a rearmed Germany could overpower France. Churchill concluded that with sufficient air power, “we might maintain ourselves as in the days of Napoleon” and “It should never be admitted that England cannot, if the worst comes to the worst, stand alone.” The military analysis as well as the rhetoric clearly lodged in Churchill’s copious memory until 1940.

Beyond Britain alone, Saltman’s study also reminds us of Churchill’s deep knowledge of global politics and personalities, vast even by the sprawling horizons of Imperial foreign policy. Churchill was aware of Hitler as early as the 1923 Munich Putsch, when many German, let alone British, politicians were blissfully ignorant of the emerging Nazi threat.

The masses of information Saltman provides, sometimes simply in bullet point lists, can seem a bit relentless for the reader, but makes an excellent source book to dip into. There is a feeling of “seminar suggested reading” here, but enhanced with frequent quotations providing the views of other historians whilst leaving the reader to decide what weight to give them.

Churchill scholars will still find much of specific interest, notably the detailed account of Churchill’s changing relationship with Neville Chamberlain, reminiscent of Leo McKinstry’s Attlee and Churchill dual biography. Chamberlain’s often forgotten final phase moving from ardent appeaser to last minute ally against a negotiated peace is justly highlighted. The vital “days in May,” when the War Cabinet met nine times in three days to discuss potential negotiations, are also impressively documented, almost in minute-by minute detail.

Such epic length may be daunting for all but dedicated Churchill enthusiasts, but surely there are enough of these amongst the readers of Finest Hour to assure an appreciative audience.