August 19, 2024

Finest Hour 200, Fourth Quarter 2022

Page 30

By Winston S. Churchill

Operation Torch involved the first introduction of American ground forces into regions of the European theater during the Second World War. Departing from ports in Britain and the United States, Anglo-American troops were ferried to three primary destinations in North-West Africa: Algiers and Oran in Algeria and Casablanca in Morocco. This amphibious invasion took place not against German controlled regions but territories under the authority of the Vichy French government, which had been formed to collaborate with Nazi Germany following the defeat of France in 1940.

The objective was to establish an Allied front that would squeeze German and Italian forces in Libya between Anglo-American armies in the west and British and Commonwealth forces in Egypt. French politics, however, seriously complicated events. The United States still maintained relations with the Vichy government, while the British government supported the Free French forces of General Charles de Gaulle. By various means, the Allies hoped to induce French commanders in North Africa not to resist the landings but to join forces with the British and Americans as a precursor to the liberation of France itself. By chance, however, the Commander-in-Chief of Vichy French forces, Admiral François Darlan, was in North Africa at the time of the landings and did not initially welcome the invasion. Consequently, and very sadly, some combat took place between Anglo-American and French forces before the French were overwhelmed and Darlan himself captured.

In The Hinge of Fate, the fourth volume of his war memoirs, Winston Churchill described how the Operation Torch unfolded. Here follow extracts.

The Approaches

Our great armadas were approaching the scene. We were determined to spare nothing to safeguard their passage. Most of the convoys that sailed from British ports had to cross the Bay of Biscay, traversing all the U-boat routes. Heavy escorts were needed, and we had somehow to conceal not only the concentration of shipping which from the beginning of October began to crowd the Clyde and other western ports but also the actual sailing of the convoys. We were completely successful.

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The Germans were led by their own Intelligence to believe that Dakar was again our aim. By the end of October about forty German and Italian U-boats were stationed to the south and east of the Azores. They were successful in severely mauling a large convoy homeward bound for Sierra Leone, and sank thirteen ships. In the circumstances this could be borne.

The first of the “Torch” convoys left the Clyde on October 22. By the 26th all the fast troopships were under way and American forces were sailing for Casablanca direct from the United States. The whole expedition of about 650 ships was now launched upon the enterprise. They traversed the Bay of Biscay or the Atlantic unseen by the U-boats or by the Luftwaffe.

All our resources were at full strain. Far to the north our cruisers watched the Denmark Strait and the exits from the North Sea to guard against intervention by enemy surface ships. Others covered the American approach near the Azores, and Anglo-American bombers attacked the U-boat bases along the French Atlantic seaboard. Despite apparent U-boat concentrations towards the Gibraltar Straits, the leading ships began to enter the Mediterranean on the night of November 5th–6th still undetected. It was not until the 7th, when the Algiers convoy was less than twenty-four hours from its destination, that it was sighted, and even then only one ship was attacked.

Gibraltar

On November 5 [Torch commander General Dwight D.] Eisenhower by a hazardous flight reached Gibraltar. I had placed the fortress within his command as the temporary headquarters of the leader of this first large-scale American and British enterprise.

Gibraltar’s climax in the war had now come. Military measures of defence were of course put into effect from September 1939 to prepare for a possible siege. Facing the Spanish frontier, a strong defensive system was gradually built up, overlooked by the Rock itself, out of which galleries were blasted for guns commanding the isthmus. Measures had to be taken also against attack from the sea and air, as well as by airborne forces. The vital need was for water, and by the middle of 1940 distillation plants were completed in the solid rock affording ample supplies and storage. This was a prodigious work.

Gibraltar’s greatest positive contribution to the war was the development of its new airfield and the use that was made of it. Starting from a mere landing strip on the racecourse, this was developed from 1942 onwards into a broad runway over a mile long, its western end built out into Gibraltar Bay with the rubble from the tunnelling. Here the great concentration of aircraft for “Torch” was made. The whole isthmus was crowded with machines, and fourteen squadrons of fighters were assembled for zero hour.

All this activity necessarily took place in full view of German observers, and we could only hope they would think it was for the reinforcement of Malta. We did all we could to make them think so. Apparently they did. Well may General Eisenhower write, “Britain’s Gibraltar made possible the invasion of North West Africa.”

The moment of the explosion had come at last. General Eisenhower, in his memoirs, has given a vivid account of his anxious experiences during the night of November 7–8, and all through the next few days. He was always very good at bearing stresses of this kind. The immensity of the stake that was being played, the uncertainty of the weather, by which all might be wrecked, the fragmentary news which arrived, the extraordinary complications of the French attitude, the danger from Spain—all, apart from the actual fighting, must have made this a very hard trial to the Commander, whose responsibilities were enormous and direct.

Algiers

Soon after 1 am on November 8 British and American landings began at many points east and west of Algiers under the direction of Rear-Admiral Burrough RN. Most careful preparations had been made for guiding the landing-craft to the chosen beaches. In the west leading units of the British 11th Brigade were completely successful, but farther east the ships and craft carrying the Americans were driven some miles from their planned positions by an unexpected tidal set, and in the darkness there was some confusion and delay. Fortunately we gained surprise and opposition along the coast was nowhere serious. After daylight, with the arrival of reinforcements, mastery was soon complete.

The most severe fighting was in the port of Algiers itself. Here the British destroyers Broke and Malcolm tried to force an entrance and land American Rangers on the mole in order to take over the harbour, occupy the batteries, and prevent the scuttling of ships. This bold action brought the two British ships under the point-blank fire of the defending batteries, and ended in disaster. The Malcolm was soon crippled, but the Broke entered the harbour at the fourth attempt and landed her troops. Later she was heavily damaged while withdrawing, and eventually sank. Many of the troops were trapped ashore and had to surrender.

At 11:30 am [Admiral] Darlan sent a further telegram to his chief [Marshal Pétain, the Vichy Head of State], saying, “Algiers will probably be taken this evening.” And at 5 pm, “American troops having entered into the city, in spite of our delaying action, I have authorised General Juin, the Commander-in-Chief, to negotiate the surrender of the city of Algiers only.”…The surrender took effect from 7 pm. From that moment Admiral Darlan was in American power, and General Juin resumed control of his command under Allied direction.

Oran

At Oran the attack was made by the United States “Center Task Force,” which had been trained and had embarked in Britain. The main assault, supported by the British Navy, was made in the Bay of Arzeu, to the east of the town, about 1 am on November 8, while two secondary landings took place to the westward. There was stronger French opposition here than at Algiers.

Various regular French units who had fought the British in Syria, and those forces under naval command whose memories of the British attack on Mers el-Kebir in 1940 were bitter, resisted. Because of these earlier events the Americans had expected greater opposition here than anywhere else, but the landings were effected as planned.

Meanwhile misfortune befell two subsidiary operations. The first was the audacious airborne descent which had been planned to seize the airfields behind Oran. A battalion of American parachute infantry set out from England on this daring adventure, but the formation became scattered over Spain in stormy weather. The leading elements passed on, but their navigation was faulty and they landed some miles from their target. Later they joined their comrades, already ashore, and played their part in capturing the airfield at Tafaroui.

The second misfortune attended the gallant attempt by two small British warships to land American troops in Oran harbour. Their object, as at Algiers, was to seize the port installations and so prevent the French from sabotaging them or scuttling shipping. The party therefore included many skilled technicians. The importance of the venture lay in the fact that it was imperative to bring the port of Oran into use as an Allied base at the earliest moment.

Led by Captain F. T. Peters RN, the Walney entered the harbour, followed by the Heartland, soon after the main landings had been launched. Both were ex-American coastguard cutters transferred to us under Lend-Lease. They encountered murderous fire at point-blank range, and both ships were destroyed, with most of the crew on board.

By dawn the French destroyers and submarines were active in Oran Bay, but were met with overwhelming force and either sunk or dispersed. Coastal batteries continued to oppose the landings, but were bombarded and bombed effectively by British naval forces, including the Rodney. Fighting continued until the morning of the 10th, when the American forces ashore launched their final attack on the city, and by noon the French had capitulated.

Casablanca

The assault on the exposed Atlantic coast of Morocco had given more anxiety during the planning than those within the Mediterranean. Not only had the whole expedition to be brought direct from American ports over the North Atlantic to their landing beaches, and in conformity with a fixed timetable, but grave concern was felt lest the weather along the coast should render landing impossible on the selected day, particularly so late in the season.

On November 7 the weather forecasts received in Admiral Hewitt’s flagship from London and Washington boded no good, and the Admiral had then to decide at once whether to adhere to his original plan or adopt the alternative, which entailed taking his whole force through the Gibraltar Straits and landing [the forces of commanding] General Patton near Nemours on little-known beaches close to the frontiers of Spanish Morocco. Apart from other considerations, this plan involved serious and possibly fatal delay. Fortunately his staff confidently predicted a temporary local improvement in the weather, and the Admiral boldly, and as it turned out correctly, backed their judgment. The die was cast, and the fleet dispersed before dark to their several destinations.

The “Western Task Force” reached the Moroccan coast before dawn on November 8. To allow for a longer approach in the darkness the time chosen for this assault was three hours later than the landings in Algeria. This had been criticised beforehand by General Patton, as he believed, not without reason, that the broadcast appeal by the President [Roosevelt] to the French people of North Africa, which was timed for the Algerian landings at 1 am, would serve merely to warn the defences in Morocco. In the event the broadcast to Morocco was of no importance, but… the defences had none the less been “Alerted” [as a result of the complicated efforts by the Allies and Free French to convince Vichy commanders not to resist the landings].

The operations comprised three landings. In the centre the main attack was made at Fedala, close to Casablanca. Flanking attacks took place at Port Lyautey in the north and at Safi in the south. The weather in the morning was fair but hazy, and the surf on the beach less severe than had been feared. Later the surf got worse, but by then a firm foothold had been gained in all areas. In some places the first troops landed unopposed, but resistance soon stiffened, and for a time there was severe fighting, particularly near Port Lyautey.

At sea a fierce action took place. In Casablanca lay the unfinished new battleship Jean Bart, incapable of movement but able to use her four 15-inch guns. She was soon engaged in a gun duel with the American battleship Massachusetts, while the French flotilla, supported by the cruiser Primauguet, put to sea to oppose the landing. They met the whole strength of the American fleet, and when operations ceased seven French ships and three submarines had been destroyed, with a thousand casualties. The Jean Bart had been gutted by fire and breached.

During the 9th the Americans consolidated their lodgment and thrust inland. It was not until the morning of November 11 that [the French commander, General] Noguès, under orders from Darlan, surrendered. “I have lost,” he reported, “all our fighting ships and aircraft after three days of violent combat.”

The assault phase of “Torch” had been a brilliant success, and was in itself a remarkable operation.