March 28, 2013

Finest Hour 155, Summer 2012

Page 48

The Appeasers Revisited

Prisms of British Appeasement: Revisionist Reputations of John Simon, Samuel Hoare, Anthony Eden, Lord Halifax and Alfred Duff Cooper, by Terrance L. Lewis. Sussex Academic Press, hardbound, illus., 234 pages, $74.95.

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By Ted Hutchinson

Mr. Hutchinson is executive director of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics and an adjunct professor of history at the New England College of Business and Finance.

Professor Lewis has produced an interesting study of five key figures heavily involved in British politics and appeasement in the 1930s, with an unusual format. Not a study of appeasement itself nor a comprehensive survey of the appeasers (there are no chapters for Baldwin or Chamberlain), the book considers “the actions and reputations” of the five title subjects. Simon, Hoare and Halifax as the author says, “have often been blamed for the failures of appeasement; Eden and Cooper, who resigned over appeasement policies, “have at least partially escaped such criticisms” (2).

Lewis uncovers little that is new about his subjects, but his method of producing a book via five mini-biographies is useful. First, it helps the reader to understand just how similar the backgrounds, politics, and temperaments of the five really were; it is not surprising how little dissension there was in the Cabinet through most of the appeasement years. Second, it helps humanize the subjects. Many of the figures who led Britain then, Simon and Hoare particularly, were quite unsympathetic; neither seemed to have many real friends. Yet Lewis shows that all five men did their best to keep Britain safe while preserving world peace during a tumultuous decade.

As the appeasers themselves argued in their respective memoirs, appeasement was not just a policy choice but one brought about by a complex confluence of public opinion, party politics, global realpolitik and financial reality.

Lewis also suggests, and makes a convincing case, that there was little substantial difference between the arch-appeasers like Chamberlain, Simon, or Halifax and those now regarded as anti- appeasers, such as Eden. In fact, in some ways Eden comes out the worst of the five. On one hand he seemed to know better than his colleagues that appeasement would only end in tragedy; but he was too ineffectual, too ambitious, and too polite to make a difference. Lewis also argues that the differences between Eden and Chamberlain were so slight that when Eden did resign almost no one in or out of politics really understood why. It didn’t matter, because the combination of his resignation, youthful good looks and careful plotting would cause many to think of him as ultimate anti-appeaser next to Churchill.

Lewis makes a powerful argument that Alfred Duff Cooper deserves a stronger historical reputation. He was a man of principle, Lewis argues, in spite of his seeming “playboy” lifestyle; his resignation speech after Munich was both honorable and devastating. Its impact was only lessoned, Lewis argues, by Chamberlain’s control of the press. Cooper played a relatively minor role in the war, and today is not as well remembered as, say, Eden. But the author argues convincingly that Cooper was a man of honor.

Although Lewis presents a sympathetic and complex portrait of all five men, he does not let any of them off the hook. Of course, he writes, the appeasers had lots of cultural and political cover for their policies: no political party wanted to rearm, and there was little appetite for it among the public. But Lewis quotes both A.L. Rowse and G.M. Trevelyan when he asks:

“What are political leaders for? Do we employ them to put across the lies they are such fools to believe? Not at all: the proper function of political leaders is to not be taken in, but to warn us. It was the duty of government to warn the country of its danger, and to lead, not follow” (144).

In spite of their many convincing and real excuses, Lewis writes, the appeasers did not lead: they followed. Readers of this journal know that perhaps the only man leading in the 1930s was Winston Churchill—and that is why he became Prime Minister when things became grim.

While not breaking new ground, Terrance Lewis’ book is engagingly written, and its unique format provides a helpful way of thinking about British appeasement in the 1930s. It is unfortunate that the high price will keep it out of the hands of most readers.