June 3, 2015

Finest Hour 112, Autumn 2001

Page 47

By Curt Zoller

Lord Kitchener and Winston Churchill: The Dardanelles Commission, Volume I, 1914-15, edited by Tim Coates. London: The Stationery Office “Uncovered Edition” series, 2000, 216 pp., £6.99. The CC Book Club will place one order for this work. Will readers desiring a copy please advise the editor but send no money, we will bill you.

In 1917 the British government issued the Dardanelles Commission First Report and Supplement and later die Dardanelles Commission Final Report, Parts I and II. The same government has now released a two-volume abridged version in its “Uncovered Editions” series, a term for “historic official papers which have not previously been available in a popular form.”

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Volume I reviews the circumstances surrounding the conception, execution and failure of the plan to sail through the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara, arrive off Constantinople and force Turkey to surrender “by ships alone.” The account is presented in narrative form, interspersed with quotations from some of the witnesses appearing before the Commission.

The Dardanelles had previously been forced in February 1807, when Great Britain sent a fleet under Admiral Duckworth to open the straits in case of necessity to act offensively against the Turks during the Napoleonic wars. Duckworth broke through and entered the Marmara with negligible losses. After eleven days the British warships returned down the straits, enduring heavy casualties from the now stronger Turkish batteries. Floating mines did not then exist.

Additional discussions on this subject were held during the Boer War, by Lord Fisher in 1904, and by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1906. During World War I, after Turkey joined the side of the Central Powers in November 1914, Churchill reconsidered the possibility as a way to defend Egypt by compelling Turkey to surrender.

What finally triggered the issue was a request by the Russian military authorities, in January 1915, for relief of the pressure on Russian troops in the Caucasus. Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, prompdy gave an affirmative answer on his own initiative, promised to make a demonstration, and informed Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, that while the Army could not spare any men, the Navy should make the effort. On 16 February, Kitchener agreed to send a large body of troops, including the 29th Division, as a back-up if needed to support the naval attack; four days later he delayed their departure, and the troops did not depart until March 10th.

Based on the final report of the Commission to the Parliament, there was ! considerable lack of communications between the decision makers and the military experts. There existed no joint military and naval staff to investigate, plan, and support the operation. Kitchener | never discussed the plan with his General Staff, acted as his own Chief of Imperial General Staff, and essentially operated as a one-man war department. Churchill held extensive discussions with Lord i Fisher, his First Sea Lord, and believed he had Fishers full support until May 1915, when he became aware of Fisher’s strong objections. Sir Arthur Wilson and Sir Henry Jackson, naval experts in the Admiralty, disagreed with the plan, but did not voice their opinion to Churchill because “it was not their concern.”

Finally, the War Council, consisting of Prime Minister Asquith, Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, Chancellor of the Exchequer Lloyd Gorge, Secretary of ; State for India the Marquess of Crewe, the Lord Chancellor Lord Haldane, Churchill and Kitchener seemed to have acted on several decisions without inquiring about critical issues. There were no discussions about staff work on such questions as the availability of troops, and the ability of naval vessels satisfactorily to destroy the Dardanelles forts.

The War Council assumed that if the Navy was unsuccessful in the attempt to force the Dardanelles, the ships could withdraw without military or political impact. Lord Fisher and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who regularly attended the War Council, said they didn’t voice their concern about the plan because “they were not specifically asked about their opinions.” Sir James Wolfe Murray, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who also regularly attended the War Council, was not kept informed by Lord Kitchener. When the War Council decided, on 13 January 1915, that “the Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as the objective,” the decision was made without adequate examination, planning and understanding of the military situation.

Kitchener delayed the dispatch of the troops for three weeks without informing Churchill or the War Council— an action which continued to show the lack of coordination and communication between the participants and decision makers and contributed to the ultimate failure. In fact the War Council did not meet at all during the week leading up to the naval attack on 18 March 1915, an almost incredible lapse of leadership.

The Commission report criticized Churchill as “having advocated the attack by ships alone before the War Council on a certain amount of half-hearted and hesitating expert opinion, which favoured a tentative or progressive scheme, beginning with an attack on the outer forts” and found that he should have assured “that the views of the naval advisers were clearly put before the Council.”

The Commission had three dissenters. Andrew Fisher, an Australian MP, dissented from the majority report’s conclusion that “naval advisers should have expressed their views to the Council, whether asked or not, if they considered that the project…impractical from the naval point of view.” Fisher said naval advisers should express opinions only when invited to do so. Another dissenter was Sir Thomas Mackenzie, who implied diat Churchill was responsible for die advisers not voicing dieir opinions. A third member, Liberal MP Walter Roch, delivered an extensive dissenting memorandum, stating that “Churchill should have consulted die Board of Admiralty,” that “he failed to present fully to die War Council the opinions of his naval advisers, and this failure was due to his own strong personal opinion in favour of a naval attack.”

In this writers opinion, Churchill’s action showed initiative and leadership in the absence any leadership from a joint military and naval planning staff, which should have been tasked by the War Council to investigate, plan and support the operation.

Mr. Zoller produces Fffs “Churchilltrivia” column and is completing a new bibliography of works about Churchill, to be published by M. E. Sharpe late this year or in early 2002.