March 12, 2015

Finest Hour 158, Spring 2013

Page 49

By Christopher H. Sterling

Churchill and Sea Power, by Christopher M. Bell. Oxford University Press, Hardbound, illus, 430 pp., $34.95. Member price $27.95. For more on this book visit http://christophermbell.ca.

Ranging over events covering nearly half a century, this is an important addition to the -already vast literature on Churchill as a military leader. A historian at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Christopher Bell has published widely on naval history. His newest study provides a quite different view of Churchill’s role compared to the rather negative perception that for decades has dominated writing on the subject.

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Stephen Roskill wrote the official Royal Navy multi-volume history, The War at Sea (1954-61), and followed that with his even more critical Churchill and the Admirals (1977). In both works, Roskill presented a severe view of Churchill’s role and impact, arguing that too often he overruled his senior naval advisers, sometimes with disastrous results (such as the bungled 1940 campaign in Norway and the loss of “Force Z” off Singapore late in 1941). Roskill’s Churchill is tempestuous and impatient for action, sometimes to the detriment of the Senior Service. Two other studies, Richard Hough’s Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea (1985), and, to a lesser degree, Peter Gretton’s Former Naval Person: Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy (1968), followed Roskill’s lead. So did many other more specialized studies, including books on the two world wars.

Putting these aside (save for some comparative comments), Bell turned to the relevant primary documents, some from World War II that were not available to earlier authors, and uses them to draw quite different conclusions. He finds Churchill’s role far more positive than many previous historians. Mistakes were clearly made—and are acknowledged and assessed—but Churchill’s full record over both world wars is described in largely positive terms.

Bell focuses closely on the interplay between the political leaders of Whitehall and senior naval officials. Perhaps unexpectedly, this makes for often quite compelling reading. We learn, for example, that Churchill was not initially attracted to an attack on the Dardanelles, telling Admiral Fisher at the start of 1915 that “it is bad war to seek cheaper victories and easier antagonists” (61). Instead, he pushed for occupation of an island off the Heligoland Bight from which to entice the German High Seas fleet out to battle, while limiting its submarine forays. Senior admirals managed to dissuade him, though Churchill raised the idea repeatedly.

Fisher’s and Churchill’s positions on the Dardanelles reversed by the early spring of 1915, as the operation became more complex, far more than the naval action Churchill originally supported— and far less of a sure thing. By the time the battle reached its frustrating climax at the end of 1915, both men were out of power, watching from the sidelines and unable to affect events.

Bell admits that while the venture “undoubtedly demonstrates Churchill’s shortcomings as a war manager and strategist,” WSC had added vital strength to the War Cabinet in the war’s opening months: He was one of the few who “possessed the knowledge and confidence to question the advice of generals and admirals, a trait that was often in short supply” (73).

Bell next shows how Churchill carried lessons from the First World War to his leadership role during the Second. One was the value of convoys in the North Atlantic—something the U.S. Navy long refused to recognize. Further, Bell argues, “Churchill’s triumph during the Second World War helped to rehabilitate his reputation from the First World War” (321).

By the early 1940s, Churchill was convinced of the greater importance of air power over sea power in protecting Britain’s interests. The loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse near Singapore in December hammered that lesson home—though the decision to head out on their ill-fated mission without air cover was not ordered by Churchill. So important did he deem air power that his deflection of men and material to RAF Bomber Command— the only means of directly attacking Germany before1944—that the Navy suffered from want of aircraft, particularly Coastal Command during the worst period of the U-boat threat. The controversy that arose over these priorities is still debated—and the author reviews the arguments well here.

Bell’s volume rewards close reading. His final summation is measured and warranted: “Winston Churchill understood the navy’s capabilities and its limitations better than probably any other politician of this period. The nation was fortunate that he was so frequently and prominently involved in managing its naval affairs” (341).

Dr. Sterling is an associate dean at the Columbian College of Arts & Sciences, GW University.