June 29, 2013

Finest Hour 135, Summer 2007

Page 35

Correspondence on Iraq, 1922

By Winston S. Churchill and David Lloyd George

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Reprinted by kind permission from the official biography, Winston S. Churchill, Companion Volume IV, Part 3, starting at page 1975. “Wee Free” may refer to the Asquith Liberals, who were “free” of the Lloyd George Coalition. An August 1920 letter along the same lines (“There is something very sinister to my mind in this Mesopotamian entanglement”) was written but not sent; see Companion Volume IV, Part 2 (Heinemann, 1977), 1199. In 1921 Churchill became Colonial Secretary and went to Cairo to settle Middle East boundaries.

WSC to DLG (Churchill papers: 17/27)
1 September 1922

I am deeply concerned about Iraq. The task you have given me is becoming really impossible. Our forces are reduced now to very slender proportions. The Turkish menace has got worse; Feisal is playing the fool, if not the knave; his incompetent Arab officials are disturbing some of the provinces and failing to collect the revenue; we overpaid £200,000 on last year’s account which it is almost certain Iraq will not be able to pay this year, thus entailing a Supplementary Estimate in regard to a matter never sanctioned by Parliament; a further deficit, in spite of large economies, is nearly certain this year on the civil expenses owing to the drop in the revenue. I have had to maintain British troops at Mosul all through the year in consequence of the Angora quarrel: this has upset the programme of reliefs and will certainly lead to further expenditure beyond the provision. I cannot at this moment withdraw these troops without practically inviting the Turks to come in. The small column which is operating in the Rania district inside our border against the Turkish raiders and Kurdish sympathisers is a source of constant anxiety to me.

I do not see what political strength there is to face a disaster of any kind, and certainly I cannot believe that in any circumstances any large reinforcements would be sent from here or from India. There is scarcely a single newspaper—Tory, Liberal or Labour—which is not consistently hostile to our remaining in this country. The enormous reductions which have been effected have brought no goodwill, and any alternative Government that might be formed here—Labour, Die-hard or Wee Free—would gain popularity by ordering instant evacuation. Moreover in my heart I do not see what we are getting out of it. Owing to the difficulties with America, no progress has been made in developing the oil. Altogether I am getting to the end of my resources.

I think we should now put definitely, not only to Feisal but to the Constituent Assembly, the position that unless they beg us to stay and to stay on our own terms in regard to efficient control, we shall actually evacuate before the close of the financial year. I would put this issue in the most brutal way, and if they are not prepared to urge us to stay and to co-operate in every manner I would actually clear out. That at any rate would be a solution. Whether we should clear out of the country altogether or hold on to a portion of the Basra vilayet is a minor issue requiring a special study.

It is quite possible, however, that face to face with this ultimatum the King, and still more the Constituent Assembly, will implore us to remain. If they do, shall we not be obliged to remain? If we remain, shall we not be answerable for defending their frontier? How are we to do this if the Turk comes in? We have no force whatever that can resist any serious inroad. The War Office, of course, have played for safety throughout and are ready to say “I told you so” at the first misfortune.

Surveying all the above, I think I must ask you for definite guidance at this stage as to what you wish and what you are prepared to do. The victories of the Turks will increase our difficulties throughout the Mohammedan world. At present we are paying eight millions a year for the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano out of which we are in no circumstances to get anything worth having.

DLG to WSC (Churchill papers: 17/27)
10 Downing Street, 5 September 1922

My dear Colonial Secretary,

I agree that the situation in Iraq requires most careful consideration, and think you should put your views before the Cabinet on Thursday.

The whole problem has arisen out of the decision to attack the Turks in Mesopotamia. Strategically, I think that decision was faulty. To be effective we had to leave our base on the sea for hundreds of miles in a torrid country utterly unfit for white fighting. We ought to have concentrated on Gallipoli and Palestine or Alexandretta. The Taurus was then unpierced. The decision was taken when I was hardly on the fringe of the War Cabinet. You were in it. Having provoked war with the Turk we had to fight him somewhere, but the swamps of the Tigris were a badly chosen battle-ground.

Whatever, however, the merits or demerits of the original decision to fight in Mesopotamia, it certainly is responsible for our difficulties now; and tracing the story back to that decision, I do not see how any of our subsequent troubles could have been avoided.

It was quite clear to me when I became Prime Minister that we could not afford to relax our campaign against the Turks in that region. Such a decision, after the withdrawal from Gallipoli, and the surrender of a British army at Kut, would have weakened our position throughout the Mahomedan world.

Having beaten the Turk both in Iraq and in Palestine, we could not at the Armistice have repudiated all our undertakings towards the Arabs. We were responsible for liberating them from Turkish sovereignty, and we were absolutely bound to assist them in setting up Arab governments, if we were not prepared to govern them ourselves.

As to the present position, it is very disappointing that Feisal has responded so badly to your excellent efforts to make him self-supporting with a minimum of British protection; but I do not think that an effective case can be made against us on that score, if we stand together and meet criticism courageously.

If we have failed in Iraq, it is because we have taken no effective steps during our years of occupation to prospect the possibilities of the country. As you know, I was anxious that the Anglo-Persian [Oil Company] should bore to ascertain the value of the oil deposits. We have, however, done practically nothing in that respect. If we leave, we may find a year or two after we have departed that we have handed over to the French and the Americans some of the richest oil fields in the world—just to purchase a derisive shout from our enemies. On general principles, I am against a policy of scuttle, in Iraq as elsewhere, and should like you to put all the alternatives, as you see them, before the Cabinet on Thursday.

Retrospect

Churchill’s warnings about Iraq are today quoted frequently, but the situation in 1920-22 had its own characteristics. Britain was quarreling with Turkey (Lloyd George was anti-Turk) and oil was not a major factor, except as a way Britain’s Iraq Mandate might “pay its own way.” America was then the main oil producer, the vast Arabian oil fields were still undiscovered, and Britain’s oil supply was assured via the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Iran. Oil was suspected to be plentiful in Iraq, and Lloyd George regretted that no effort had been made to confirm this and exploit it.

In his unsent 1920 letter to Lloyd George, Churchill declared that the Arabs had “laid aside the blood feuds they have nursed for centuries and that the Suni and Shiah [sic] tribes are working together.” Was he right? Perhaps not, but apparently today the opposite situation exists. The Iraqi leader who could get the Sunni, Kurds and Shia to work together would be heralded as a wizard of Bismarckian proportions.

The British decision to hold Iraq by air power, bucking up the Hashemite King Feisal while withdrawing troops, was taken in Cabinet. Iraq obtained nominal independence in 1932. The thirty-five-year Hashemite dynasty, after several coup attempts and revolts, finally fell in the revolution of 1958, which led to the Ba’athists and, ultimately, to Saddam Hussein. —Ed.