June 3, 2015

Finest Hour 112, Autumn 2001

Page 50

Correspondence over “Listserv Winston”

The Churchill Center maintains an internet listgroup that allows you to communicate with 500″people worldwide on any Churchill subject. Subscriptions are free. To subscribe, send the two word message SUBSCRIBE WINSTON, followed by your name, to: listserv@vm. marist.edu and then follow the instructions you receive back. The listgroup is maintained for us by kind courtesy ofMarist College. If you have any problems, email our host, Prof. Jonah Triebwasser ([email protected]).

Point

David Kennedy’s Freedom from Fear (612) states: “Even larger anxieties proliferated about Soviet intentions. In midsummer 1943 Stalin had withdrawn his ambassadors from both London and Washington. In September came rumors that the Germans had extended a peace feeler to Moscow through Japan stimulating anew the fear of a separate settlement in eastern Europe before a second front had even opened in the west. One observer detected “an atmosphere alarmingly reminiscent of that which had preceded the Molotov Ribbentrop pact of August 1939.” There’s a footnote to Foreign Relations of the United States (1943) and Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, 734.

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Counterpoint

In 1943, Stalin fumed over the failure of FDR and Churchill to launch a second front, and wrote them a message full of contempt. Sherwood states (697): “Undoubtedly [Roosevelt’s] timing of the [Unconditional Surrender] statement at Casablanca was attributable to the uproar over Darlan and Peyrouton and the liberal fears that this might indicate a willingness to make similar deals with a Goering in Germany or a Matsuoka in Japan.” Stalin’s fuming occurred after Casablanca—so evidently FDR’s proclamation didn’t satisfy him.

Here are excerpts from Stalin’s letter to Roosevelt, 11 June 1943:

Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 19411945, Moscow: 1957, II: 64-65.

You will doubtless recall that the joint message of January 26, sent by you and Mr Churchill, announced the decision…to divert considerable German ground and air forces from the Russian front and bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Then on February 12 Mr Churchill communicated on his own behalf and yours the specified time of the Anglo-American operation in Tunisia and the Mediterranean, as well as on the west coast of Europe…in August 1943.

Now, in May 1943, you and Mr Churchill have decided to postpone the Anglo-American invasion of Western Europe until the spring of 1944….Your decision creates exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union, which, straining all its resources for the past two years, has been engaged against the main forces of Germany..and leaves the Soviet Army, which is fighting not only for its country, but also for its Allies, to do the job alone, almost single handed….Need I speak of the disheartening negative impression that this fresh postponement of the second front and withholding from our Army, which has sacrificed so much, of the anticipated substantial support by the Anglo-American armies, will produce in the Soviet Union—both among the people and in the Army?

As for the Soviet Government, it cannot align itself with this decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent course of the war.

Sherwood (734) says this made Churchill “so angry that he sent [Stalin] a scorching cable to which Roosevelt would never have agreed had he been given a chance to read it in advance.” Sherwood is incorrect. Churchill sent FDR the cable (C-310) on 12 June (see Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: Their Complete Correspondence 11:245-47), and it is not “scorching.” The toughest line in it is: “It would be no help to Russia if we threw away a hundred thousand men in a disastrous cross-channel attack such as would, in my opinion, certainly occur if we tried under present conditions….” Churchill accompanied it by a dispassionate note to FDR (C309), saying Stalin’s reaction could have been anticipated and, that he was ready to go anywhere anytime to a Big Three meeting. (“I am practising every day with my pistol to make head against the mosquitoes.”)

Roosevelt responded, “I heartily approve of your reply” (R-289, Kimball, 261) and wrote Stalin on June 20th: “What the Prime Minister cabled you has my full accord.” (Moscow Correspondence, 66). Churchill’s cable is excised from the Soviet Correspondence. Surprise!

Kimball (11:259-60) notes that FDR wished to meet Stalin, but Sherwood states (734): “The Roosevelt-Stalin meeting was postponed indefinitely. It was fortunate that Hitler did not know how bad the relations were between the Allies at that moment, how close they were to the disruption which was his only hope of survival.” Does this suggest that Stalin contemplated a separate peace with Hitler in 1943? What he thought about the Anglo-Americans seems to be nothing compared to what he thought about Hitler.

Point

A list subscriber questioned whether Churchill was in agreement in principal with the “Unconditional Surrender” proclamation by Roosevelt at Casablanca, and whether this prolonged the war, etc.

I believe one of the aims of “Unconditional Surrender” was to keep the Soviets on the same path as the Anglo-Americans and steer them away from an alternate path, such as a separate peace with Germany. I believe the Allies would have been remiss (based on what was known then, not now) in not considering the possibility of Hitler and Stalin finding terms for a ceasefire. Hitler, for example, could have offered Stalin strategic withdrawal to the Bug River. By 1944-45, of course, Hitler had nothing left to tempt Stalin.

It’s easy now to understand in hindsight that no German-Soviet accord was possible in 1943: but I think that Stalin’s loyalty to them was a huge concern for Roosevelt and Churchill up until the third or fourth quarter of 1943, and that they worried over keeping him in the war. I believe “Unconditional Surrender” kept everyone planning for the same outcomes and reminded the leaders that they shared common goals. I believe it shortened the war. Can anyone seriously imagine the Allies having productive talks with Hitler or Tojo?

Counterpoint

Sherwood/Kimball offer little evidence that Roosevelt and Churchill feared Russia would deal with Hitler, even in 1943. Their concern seemed to be keeping Stalin a partner rather than an independent contractor. After seeing half of European Russia fall to the Germans, would Stalin have made peace with them? Stalin did like to needle FDR and WSC, but when they erupted he backed off. This worked to a certain extent: e.g., though he didn’t get the Second Front in 1943, he did get the Anglo-Americans to pull up well to the west in 1945.

Did Unconditional Surrender shorten or lengthen the war? Many historians say Germany would have been more willing to come to terms earlier, removing the Fuehrer in the process, had surrender been less than “unconditional.” Still, Hitler had an annoying way of surviving plots. Re Japan, some say they were ready to surrender before the bomb, provided they could keep the Emperor. Which, in fact, was allowed (so their surrender was not unconditional). But this possibility was not taken seriously by Truman, who had to make the cataclysmic decision to use the bomb.