August 23, 2013

Finest Hour 110, Spring 2001

Page 30

BY SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL • COMMENTARY BY CHRISTOPHER M. BELL

Graf Spee, Altmark, and the Battle of the River Plate

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INTRODUCTION

When Sir Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in September 1939, the Royal Navy faced the U-boat threat with confidence. It seemed unlikely that Germany would once again adopt a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which would risk alienating neutral states and possibly bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side, as it had done in 1917. But even if Hitler proved willing to accept this danger, the Admiralty was certain that the combination of convoy and sonar would ensure the defeat of Germany’s still relatively small U-boat force. The threat from this quarter seemed manageable.

Surface ships were another matter. During World War I Germany’s large and powerful High Seas Fleet had remained concentrated in its home waters, posing a constant menace to the British Grand Fleet but failing to achieve significant strategic results. In 1939 the greatest threat to Britain’s maritime communications came from the dispersal of Germany’s small force of modern, powerful surface ships to prey on British shipping. As the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, noted, “Nothing would paralyse our supply system and seaborne trade so successfully as attack by surface raiders.”

These raiders came various forms, but potentially the most dangerous at this stage were Germany’s three “pocket battleships,” conceived under the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Designed to operate as powerful commerce raiders, built for endurance and armed with 11-inch guns, these vessels significantly outgunned the six- and eight-inch gun cruisers that protected Britain’s far-flung maritime trade.

In September 1939 two pocket battleships, Graf Spee and Deutschland, were already in the Atlantic awaiting the commencement of hostilities. Graf Spee, commanded by Captain Langsdorff, was the more aggressive of the two raiders.

Graf Spee’s first victim was the British liner Clement, sunk off the coast of Brazil on 30 September. Within a month the pocket battleship had claimed five more ships in the South Atlantic. Her practice, Churchill later noted, “was to make a brief appearance at some point, claim a victim, and vanish again into the trackless ocean wastes.”

In response, the Admiralty formed nine separate “hunting groups,” comprising all of the “available aircraft carriers, supported by battleships, battle cruisers, and cruisers.” No fewer than twenty-three allied warships scoured the vast sea lanes for the two German raiders. “This disproportion between the strength of the enemy and the counter-measures forced upon us was vexatious,” Churchill observed. “It recalled to me the anxious weeks before the actions at Coronel and later at the Falkland Islands in December, 1914, when we had to be prepared at seven or eight different points, in the Pacific and South Atlantic, “for the arrival of powerful German commerce raiders.

As in 1914, Churchill and the Admiralty waited anxiously for news of the enemy’s movements. On 15 November 1939 the Graf Spee suddenly appeared in the Indian Ocean, sinking a British tanker in the Mozambique Channel. Captain Langsdorff then confounded his pursuers by doubling back around the Cape of Good Hope and returning to the South Atlantic, where he claimed more ships in early December. The nearest hunting group, “Force G,” consisted of the British cruisers Cumberland, Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles. Its commander was Commodore Henry Harwood. —CMB

THE HUNT FOR GRAF SPEE

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

From the beginning of the war Commodore Harwood’s special care and duty had been to cover British shipping off the River Plate and Rio de Janeiro. He was convinced that sooner or later Graf Spee would come towards the Plate, where the richest prizes were offered to her. He had carefully thought out the tactics which he would adopt in an encounter. Together, his 8-inch cruisers Cumberland and Exeter, and his 6-inch cruisers Ajax and Achilles, could not only catch but kill. However, the needs of fuel and refit made it unlikely that all four would be present “on the day.” If they were not, the issue was disputable. On hearing that the Doric Star had been sunk on December 2nd, Harwood guessed right. Although she was over 3,000 miles away he assumed that the Spee would come towards the Plate. He estimated with luck and wisdom that she might arrive by the 13th. He ordered all his available forces to concentrate there by December 12th. Alas, Cumberland was refitting at the Falklands; but on the morning of the 13th Exeter, Ajax and Achilles were in company at the centre of the shipping routes off the mouth of the river. Sure enough, at 6.14 a.m., smoke was sighted to the east. The longed-for collision had come.

Harwood in the Ajax, disposing his forces so as to attack the pocket battleship from widely-divergent quarters and thus confuse her fire, advanced at the utmost speed of his small squadron. Captain Langsdorff thought at the first glance that he had only to deal with one light cruiser and two destroyers, and he too went full speed ahead; but a few moments later he recognised the quality of his opponents, and knew that a mortal action impended. The two forces were now closing at nearly 50 miles an hour. Langsdorff had but a minute to make up his mind. His right course would have been to turn away immediately so as to keep his assailants as long as possible under the superior range and weight of his 11-inch guns, to which the British could not at first have replied. He would thus have gained for his undisturbed firing the difference between adding speeds and subtracting them. He might well have crippled one of his foes before any could fire at him. He decided on the contrary to hold on his course and make for Exeter. The action therefore began almost simultaneously on both sides.

Commodore Harwood’s tactics proved advantageous. The 8-inch salvoes from Exeter struck the Spee from the earliest stages of the fight. Meanwhile the 6-inch cruisers were also hitting hard and effectively. Soon the Exeter received a hit which, besides knocking out B turret, destroyed all the communications on the bridge, killed or wounded nearly all upon it, and put the ship temporarily out of control. By this time however the 6-inch cruisers could no longer be neglected by the enemy, and the Spee shifted her main armament to them, thus giving respite to the Exeter at a critical moment. The German battleship, plastered from three directions, found the British attack too hot, and soon afterwards turned away under a smoke-screen with the apparent intention of making for the River Plate. Langsdorff had better have done this earlier. After this turn the Spee once more engaged the Exeter, hard hit by the 11-inch shells. All her forward guns were out of action. She was burning fiercely amidships and had a heavy list. Captain Bell, unscathed by the explosion on the bridge, gathered two or three officers round him in the after control-station, and kept his ship in action with her sole remaining turret until at 7.30 failure of pressure put this too out of action. He could do no more. At 7.40 Exeter turned away to effect repairs and took no further part in the fight.

The Ajax and Achilles, already in pursuit, continued the action in the most spirited manner. The Spee turned all her heavy guns upon them. By 7.25 the two after-turrets in the Ajax had been knocked out, and the Achilles had also suffered damage. These two light cruisers were no match for the enemy in gun-power, and finding that his ammunition was running low, Harwood in the Ajax decided to break off the fight till dark, when he would have better chances of using his lighter armament effectively, and perhaps his torpedoes. He therefore turned away under cover of smoke, and the enemy did not follow. This fierce action had lasted an hour and twenty minutes. During all the rest of the day the Spee made for Montevideo, the British cruisers hanging grimly on her heels with only occasional interchanges of fire. Shortly after midnight the Spee entered Montevideo and lay there repairing damage, taking in stores, landing wounded, transhipping personnel to a German merchant ship, and reporting to the Fuehrer. Ajax and Achilles lay outside, determined to dog her to her doom should she venture forth. Meanwhile on the night of the 14th the Cumberland, which had been steaming at full speed from the Falklands, took the place of the utterly crippled Exeter. The arrival of this 8-inch gun cruiser restored to its narrow balance a doubtful situation.

It had been most exciting to follow the drama of this brilliant action from the Admiralty War Room, where I spent a large part of the 13th. Our anxieties did not end with the day. Mr. Chamberlain was at that time in France on a visit to the Army. On the 17th I wrote to him:

If the Spee breaks out as she may do tonight we hope to renew the action of the 13th with the Cumberland, an 8 in.-gun ship, in the place of the six-gun Exeter. The Spee knows now that Renown and Ark Royal are oiling at Rio, so this is her best chance. The Dorsetshire and Shropshire who are coming across from the Cape are still three and four days away respectively. It is fortunate that the Cumberland was handy at the Falklands, as Exeter was heavily damaged. She was hit over a hundred times, one turret smashed, three guns knocked out, and sixty officers and men killed and twenty wounded. Indeed the Exeter fought one of the finest and most resolute actions against superior range and metal on record. Every conceivable precaution has been taken to prevent the Spee slipping out unobserved, and I have told Harwood [who is now an Admiral and a K.C.B.] that he is free to attack her anywhere outside the three-mile limit. We should prefer however that she should be interned, as this will be less creditable to the German Navy than being sunk in action. Moreover a battle of this kind is full of hazard, and needless bloodshed must never be sought.

The whole of the Canadians came in safely this morning under the protection of the main fleet and [are] being welcomed by Anthony, Massey, and I trust a good part of the people of Greenock and Glasgow. We plan to give them a cordial reception. They are to go to Aldershot, where no doubt you will go and see them presently.

There have been ten air attacks today on individual ships along the East Coast from Wick to Dover, and some of the merchant ships have been machine-gunned out of pure spite, some of our people being hit on their decks. I am sure you must be having a most interesting time at the Front, and I expect you will find that change is the best kind of rest.

From the moment when we heard that action was joined we instantly ordered powerful forces to concentrate off Montevideo, but our hunting groups were naturally widely dispersed and none was within 2,000 miles of the scene. In the north, Force K, comprising the Renown and Ark Royal, was completing a sweep which had begun at Capetown ten days before and was now 600 miles east of Pernambuco, and 2,500 miles from Montevideo. Farther north still, the cruiser Neptune with three destroyers had just parted company with the French Force X and were coming south to join Force K. All these were ordered to Montevideo; they had first to fuel at Rio. However, we succeeded in creating the impression that they had already left Rio and were approaching Montevideo at 30 knots.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Force H was returning to the Cape for fuel after an extended sweep up the African coast. Only the Dorsetshire was immediately available at Capetown and was ordered at once to join Admiral Harwood, but she had over 4,000 miles to travel. She was followed later by the Shropshire. In addition, to guard against the possible escape of the Spee to the eastward, Force I, comprising Cornwall, Gloucester and the aircraft-carrier Eagle from the East Indies station, which at this time was at Durban, was placed at the disposal of the C.-in-C, South Atlantic.

*****

Meanwhile Captain Langsdorff telegraphed on December 16 to the German Admiralty as follows:

Strategic position off Montevideo. Besides the cruisers and destroyers, Ark Royal and Renown. Close blockade at
night; escape into open sea and breakthrough to home waters hopeless….Request decision on whether the ship should be scuttled in spite of insufficient depth in the Estuary of the Plate, or whether internment is to be preferred.

At a conference presided over by the Fuehrer, at which Raeder and Jodl were present, the following answer was decided on:

Attempt by all means to extend the time in neutral waters. …Fight your way through to Buenos Aires if possible. No internment in Uruguay. Attempt executive destruction, if ship is scuttled.

As the German envoy in Montevideo reported later that further attempts to extend the time-limit of 72 hours were fruitless these orders were confirmed by the German Supreme Command.

Accordingly during the afternoon of the 17th the Spee transferred more than 700 men, with baggage and provisions, to the German merchant ship in the harbour. Shortly afterwards Admiral Harwood learnt that she was weighing anchor. At 6.15 p.m., watched by immense crowds, she left harbour and steamed slowly seawards, awaited hungrily by the British cruisers. At 8.54 p.m., as the sun sank, the Ajax’s aircraft reported: “Graf Spee has blown herself up.” The Renown and Ark Royal were still a thousand miles away.

Langsdorff was broken-hearted by the loss of his ship. In spite of the full authority he had received from his Government, he wrote on December 19:

I can now only prove by my death that the Fighting services of the Third Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag. I alone bear the responsibility for scuttling the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee. I am happy to pay with my life for any possible reflection on the honour of the flag. I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and the future of the nation and of my Fuehrer.

That night he shot himself.

Thus ended the first surface challenge to British trade on the oceans. No other raider appeared until the spring of 1940, when a new campaign opened, utilising disguised merchant ships. These could more easily avoid detection, but on the other hand could be mastered by lesser forces than those required to destroy a pocket battleship.

THE SEARCH FOR ALTMARK

A vivid episode now sharpened everything in Scandinavia. The reader will remember my concern to capture the Altmark, the auxiliary of the Spee. This vessel was also a floating prison for the crews of our sunk merchant-ships. British captives released by Captain Langsdorff according to International Law in Montevideo harbour told us that nearly three hundred British merchant seamen were on board the Altmark. This vessel hid in the South Atlantic for nearly two months, and then, hoping that the search had died down, her captain made a bid to return to Germany. Luck and the weather favoured her, and not until February 14th, after passing between Iceland and the Faroes, was she sighted by our aircraft in Norwegian territorial waters.

First Lord to First Sea Lord. 16.2.40.

On the position as reported to me this morning, it would seem that the cruiser and destroyers should sweep northward during the day up die coast of Norway, not hesitating to arrest Altmark in territorial waters should she be found. This ship is violating neutrality in carrying British prisoners of war to Germany. Surely another cruiser or two should be sent to rummage the Skagerrak to-night? The Altmark must be regarded as an invaluable trophy.

In the words of an Admiralty communique “certain of His Majesty’s ships which were conveniently disposed were set in motion.” A destroyer flotilla, under the command of Captain Philip Vian, of H.M.S. Cossack, intercepted the Altmark but did not immediately molest her. She took refuge in Josing Fiord, a narrow inlet about a mile and a half long surrounded by high snow-clad cliffs. Two British destroyers were told to board her for examination. At the entrance to the fiord they were met by two Norwegian gunboats, who informed them that the ship was unarmed, had been examined the previous day, and had received permission to proceed to Germany, making use of Norwegian territorial waters. Our destroyers thereupon withdrew.

When this information reached the Admiralty I intervened, and with the concurrence of the Foreign Secretary, ordered our ships to enter the fiord. I did not often act so directly; but I now sent Captain Vian the following order:

February 16, 1940, 5.25 p.m

Unless a Norwegian torpedo-boat undertakes to convoy Altmark to Bergen with a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard on board, and a joint escort, you should board Altmark, liberate the prisoners, and take possession of the ship pending further instructions. If Norwegian torpedo-boat interferes, you should warn her to stand off. If she fires upon you, you should not reply unless attack is serious, in which case you should defend yourself, using no more force than is necessary, and ceasing fire when she desists.

Vian did the rest. That night in the Cossack with searchlights burning he entered the fiord through the ice floes. He first went on board the Norwegian gunboat Kjell and requested that the Altmark should be taken to Bergen under a joint escort, for inquiry according to International Law. The Norwegian captain repeated his assurance that the Altmark had been twice searched, that she was unarmed, and that no British prisoners had been found. Vian then stated that he was going to board her, and invited the Norwegian officer to join him. This offer was eventually declined.

Meanwhile Altmark got under way, and in trying to ram Cossack ran herself aground. The Cossack forced her way alongside and a boarding party sprang across, after grappling the two ships together. A sharp hand-to-hand fight followed, in which four Germans were killed and five wounded; part of the crew fled ashore and the rest surrendered. The search began for the British prisoners. They were soon found in their hundreds, battened down, locked in storerooms, and even in an empty oil-tank. Then came the cry, “The Navy is here.” The doors were broken in and the captives rushed on deck. Altogether 299 prisoners were released and transferred to our destroyers. It was also found that Altmark carried two pom-poms and four machine guns, and that despite having been boarded twice by the Norwegians, she had not been searched. The Norwegian gun-boats remained passive observers throughout. By midnight Vian was clear of the fiord, and making for the Firth of Forth.

Admiral Pound and I sat up together in some anxiety in the Admiralty War Room. I had put a good screw on the Foreign Office, and was fully aware of the technical gravity of the measures taken. To judge them fairly it must be remembered that up to that date Germany had sunk 218,000 tons of Scandinavian shipping with a loss of 555 Scandinavian lives. But what mattered at home and in the Cabinet was whether British prisoners were found on board or not. We were delighted when at three o’clock in the morning news came that 299 had been found and rescued. This was a dominating fact.

AFTERWORD

The British people, who expected great things from the Royal Navy, were jubilant over the destruction of the Graf Spee and the rescue of British sailors from the Altmark. Churchill basked in the Navy’s glory and wasted no time in publicizing these events. On 18 December, he announced to the world that the pocket battleship Graf Spee “had met her doom, and throughout a vast expanse of water peaceful shipping of all nations may, for a spell at least, enjoy the freedom of the seas.”

Churchill was clearly delighted that the enemy raider had been ignominiously chased into a neutral harbour, “in spite of her far heavier metal and commanding range,” by a weaker and battered British force. This was the sort of battle that fired Churchill’s imagination, and seemed to confirm that the Royal Navy could still be counted upon to outstrip its rivals in the qualities that mattered most: aggressive spirit, tactical skill, courage, and determination.

The Graf Spee, in contrast, was castigated for emerging from Montevideo “not to fight, but to sink herself in the fairway of a neutral State from whom she had received such shelter and succour as international law prescribes.” Casting further aspersions on German honour, Churchill claimed (incorrectly) that “the Graf Spee knew that the British heavy ships Renown and Ark Royal were still a thousand miles away” when she emerged from harbour. “All that awaited her outside, ” he revealed, “were the two six-inch gun cruisers, Ajax and Achilles, who had chased her in, and the eight-inch gun cruiser Cumberland, which had arrived to take the place of the damaged Exeter.”

Churchill was later on hand to greet Exeter when she returned to Plymouth on 15 February 1940. In an address to the ship’s company, he proclaimed that the Battle of the River Plate “will long be told in song and story.”

When you came up the river this morning, when you entered the harbour and saw the crowds cheering on the banks, one may almost think that there were other spectators in the great shades of the past, carrying us back to the days of Drake and Raleigh, to the great sea dogs of the olden times. If their spirits brooded on this scene you would be able to say to them “We, your descendants, still make war and have not forgotten the lessons you taught.’

The victors of the River Plate had become national heroes and Churchill was eager to lead the nation’s tribute. On the morning of 23 February, the companies of Exeter and Ajax assembled at Waterloo station and proceeded through London amid “tumultuous cheering,” The Times noted, to the Horse Guards Parade, where they were inspected by King George VI. Churchill was present along with other members of the Cabinet and Board of Admiralty, and spoke later that day at a luncheon in their honour at the Guildhall. Once again, the First Lord invoked Britain’s long and glorious naval history in praising the ships’ companies:

The warrior heroes of the past may look down, as Nelson’s monument looks down upon us now, without any feeling that the island race has lost its daring or that the examples which they set in bygone centuries have faded as the generations have succeeded to one another.

To the glorious action off the Plate there has recently been added an epilogue—the rescue last week by the Cossack and her flotilla under the noses of the enemy and amid the tangles of one-sided neutrality—the rescue of British captives taken from the sunken German raider. Their rescue at the very moment when those unhappy men were about to be delivered over into indefinite German bondage proves that the long arm of British sea power can be stretched out, not only for foes but also for faithful friends.

“And,” he concluded, “to Nelson’s immortal signal of 135 years ago, ‘England expects that every man will do his duty,’ there may now be added last week’s not less proud reply: ‘The Navy is here.'” —CMB 
 

Dr. Bell is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. He is author of The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (reviewed FH 109). Churchill’s text from The Grand Alliance (1948), reprinted by kind permission of Winston S. Churchill.