May 14, 2013

DESPATCH BOX: FINESTHOUR 140, AUTUMN 2008

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HAPPY FORTIETH

Producing any type of magazine is no mean feat and so I would like to put pen to paper and say how much I appreciate receiving both Finest Hour and the Chartwell Bulletin. I cannot think of a finer tribute to Churchill’s memory than these two publications. So congratulations to all those involved in the production and for providing so much pleasure and interest over the years.

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JOHN FROST, NEW BARNET, HERTS.

• With which you have had much to do, John! See “Datelines,” page 8.

CHARTWELL FLOOR PLAN

Anent the review of Churchill & Chartwell (FH 138:52), I would be interested to know if there is a floor plan of Chartwell during Churchill’s residence.

ALEX DAVIS, NEW ZEALAND

• Stefan Buczacki, author of Churchill & Chartwell, replies: The short answer is: not as far as I am aware. Almost no plans survive from Churchill’s architect Philip Tilden, and no one else had any reason to draw up floor plans before the National Trust acquired the property. Moreover, the layout and disposition of the rooms changed considerably during the Churchills’ occupation. For instance, by the end of World War II there was a cinema in the dining room, some of the bedrooms were in different places and the kitchen was upstairs. The NT have chosen, in accord with Churchill’s wishes, to display the house more or less as it was in the 1930s, although even here there are differences—for example some of the rooms (servants’ rooms especially) are now used as Trust offices or staff accommodation. One of the editor’s (very few!) criticisms in his generous review of my book was that there was no floor plan and I agree—my publishers said there simply wasn’t space because of the many photographs! Contact the National Trust at Chartwell via their website and they should be able to supply a fairly basic layout.

MORE LEOPOLD

Further to “Was Leopold Guilty?”(FH 138:42) may we also point out that Belgium’s neutral status under the Treaty of London (1839) disappeared in 1914. In 1936 Belgium adopted “a policy of independence” (translation), the word for “neutrality” being carefully avoided. Also, the King’s visit to Hitler was not disclosed until after the war so it is wrong to state that it caused unpopularity during the war.

At dawn on 25 May, four ministers called on the King at his headquarters near Bruges. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs asked: “Will the King have a Government at his side? Leopold: “Obviously yes, as I am not a dictator.” Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot asked: “Will the present Government, which will continue the war, be that of the King?” Leopold: “No, because that Government will be against me.”

(Leopold III, Pour l’Histoire, Brussels: Editions Racine, 2001, Chapter X, trans.) Leopold later complained bitterly that he had had no time to prepare for “the tragic misunderstanding of Wynendaele on 25 May 1940.”

You also state incorrectly that the Belgian government fled France in late October and that Spaak and Pierlot did not accompany it. One fully empowered member of the government, Minister of Colonies Albert de Vleeschauwer, reached England on 4 July 1940, committing all Belgian overseas assets to the pursuit of the war at a meeting with Churchill on the 8th. Churchill said that as a junior minister, de Vleeschauwer could represent his country; he insisted that he return to the Continent and persuade his colleagues to come to England.

After three arduous weeks de Vleeschauwer managed to meet Pierlot, Spaak and Minister of Finance Camille Gutt, and convinced them to leave Vichy. Gutt joined him straightaway. Pierlot and Spaak, who returned to Vichy to clear matters with the rest of the cabinet, left on 28 August, but were interned in Spain until 21 October. They reached London three days later.

As regards “an armistice with Hitler” and “Nazi puppets” Pierlot never attempted anything of the sort. However he did offer the resignation of his government to allow Leopold to form a new government for the purpose of negotiating with the Germans. Leopold bluntly refused to accept this resignation, which he considered a political action he could not take as a POW. Thereby he did, fortuitously, contribute to the legitimacy of the government-in-exile.

The 1950 “referendum” exercise was called “a people’s consultation” which ended in favour of Leopold but it was not binding and the result was not respected. After the liberation, in a joint session on 19 September 1945, the Belgian Parliament approved all legislative and administrative decisions taken by the government since it left Brussels in May 1940 in an unanimous vote of confidence. Furthermore the Belgian Supreme Court decided that all measures taken in Paris, Poitiers and London were valid collegiate decisions thus clearly establishing the legitimacy of the wartime government, notwithstanding its deplorable quarrel with the King.

LUDO BARON DE VLEESCHAUWER VAN BRAEKEL GEOFFREY FLETCHER, BELGIUM

• Editor’s response: I am happy to stipulate that Leopold visited Hitler in November not October; that it added to his unpopularity after but not during the war; and that Spaak and Pierlot eventually reached London. I will not argue the semantics of words like “neutrality” or “referendum.” It seems clear that Belgium in the 1930s adopted armed neutrality; and that the 1950 “people’s consultation” was a referendum, however one translates it. My object was to determine whether King Leopold adequately warned his allies of the Belgian surrender and to discuss the reasons for Churchill’s reactions, which I did. The relations between Leopold and his ministers are beyond my ken, but Col. Van Leemput’s following letter may explain which Belgians wanted an armistice with the Germans.

SEEKING AN ARMISTICE

First, I congratulate you on your fine article. I was pleased to sit down with the letter cosigned by my good friend Ludo Baron de Vleeschauwer, whose knowledge, because of his father’s involvement during the war, is considerable. I fear, however, that Ludo is a bit too mild about Pierlot.

You were indeed correct to state that “Spaak and Pierlot considered the war to be lost.” I do have a slightly different opinion about Pierlot’s intentions, as described by Roger Keyes in A Sea of Troubles: On 18 June 1940 Spaak wrote to Paul Baudouin at the Quai d’Orsay:

“…The Belgian government is also willing to negotiate an armistice between Germany and Belgium, but before committing herself to anything, she finds it indispensable to make contact with the King and requests therefore a safe conduct for two members of the government” (translation).

Also on 18 June, during the Cabinet meeting, Pierlot (after being informed that France was seeking an armistice) stated (translation): “I have considered the problem from all sides. We will not go to England. France has thrown in the towel. We abandon, at the same time, the battle.” To which Spaak added: “Our mandate is accomplished. We have done our duty.” From the above it appears to be quite obvious that Pierlot and Spaak would have preferred to return to Belgium and to install a new government under German occupation.

LT. COL. (RET.) LOUIS VAN LEEMPUT NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, VETERANS KING LEOPOLD III

BUCHANAN REDUX

Professor Freeman’s review of Pat Buchanan’s book rightly criticizes the author for trying to demonize Churchill, while occasionally conceding that Hitler was a less than sterling character. But the review leaves out Buchanan’s legitimate, albeit by now shopworn, contention that Versailles and its consequences were the product of extreme vindictiveness, rampant nationalism, out of touch idealism (especially on the part of President Wilson), and irrational arrangements. Buchanan’s main thesis therefore is actually that, if only people were virtuous and far-seeing, the war would indeed have been unnecessary. This is an unexceptionable
conclusion which requires no revisionist to argue in over 400 pages. Ever hear of Original Sin, Pat?

MANFRED WEIDHORN, FAIR LAWN, N.J.

• David Freeman replies: I appreciate what Professor Weidhorn is saying, but as I was reviewing the book for Finest Hour I naturally felt that I should concentrate on its Churchillian aspects. Goodness knows the book has not lacked for other reviews.

I think that both my review and Professor Weidhorn’s remarks indicate that Buchanan’s book is badly structured. It almost seems that Buchanan set out to write yet another tome blasting the folly of Versailles, but decided it would not sell very well so he tacked on a lengthy chapter blaming everything on Churchill. This enabled him to put Churchill’s name and face on the cover, attract more attention and sell more books. For good measure, he then wrote one further chapter to conclude that all he had written explains what he sees as the misguided policies of President Bush.

People get so caught up in looking at the faults of the Versailles settlement and Wilson’s commitment to self-determination that they forget to see what was accomplished: For the first time in modern history millions of people in central Europe and the Middle East enjoyed the status of having their own nation-states. While many of these countries may have stumbled through the last ninety years in an effort to establish good government, that has not diminished their sense of national identity. I am quite sure that the Poles, Hungarians, Iraqis etc. prefer having their own country no matter how bad the leadership than returning to Imperial servitude. After all, none of these countries thus far has been clamoring for a return to the 1914 status quo ante bellum.

FINEST HOUR 139

Great edition of FH. In Ray Callahan’s article on Orde Wingate, one of the pictures shows Wingate talking with a Colonel Cochran, USAAC. Cochran was a good friend of Milton Caniff, the creator of the comic strip “Terry and the Pirates” (and later “Steve Canyon”). Caniff incorporated Cochran into the wartime “Terry” strips as Terry’s friend and protector, Flip Corkin, replacing Pat Ryan, who performed similar functions for Terry in the prewar years.

COL. DAVID JABLONSKY, CARLISLE, PENNA.

FH 139 is in its tradition of the highest standards of scholarship and presentation. Moving the book reviews to the front section seemingly runs counter to standard practice but really worked very well, particularly to emphasize two painfully absurd revisionist histories. It was right to mention that neither Buchanan nor Baker is proposing a new thesis, or indeed any new evidence. Their arguments trace back to 1940. It seems appropriate to quote a very apt British phrase to categorize mental laziness: “The man’s a bloody wanker!” Readers owe a debt to Messrs. Freeman, Roberts and Kimball, who have certainly saved us the price and the time it would take to read these two insignificant publications.

ROBIN BATES, MESA, ARIZ.

I’ve always thought of F.E. Smith as the swashbuckling older brother Winston Churchill never had. As to his quotation about “the best of everything,” the following line from GBS’s “Major B” (1905), spoken by Lady Britomart (ouch!) in act 1, scene 1, probably preceded F.E.’s quip: “I know your quiet, simple, refined, poetic people like Adolphus—quite content with the best of everything!”

ROBERT PILPEL, WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.

The second endnote to Barry Gough’s paper about the loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse gives the impression that heavy naval losses connected with the evacuation of Crete were due to faulty command decisions. Admiral Cunningham, per his biographer John Winton, said: “It has always been the duty of the Navy to take the Army overseas to battle and, if the Army fail, to bring them back again….If, gentlemen, you now order the army in Crete to surrender, the Fleet will still go there to bring off the Marines.” Had the army been able to hold on a few more days, the German assault would have failed because of the extreme difficulties they were experiencing. If nothing else, the defence of Crete broke the enemy’s elite airborne forces and from then on they were used solely as infantry.

NORMAN HUNT, COULSDON, SURREY

• David Ramsay replies: I think this is beside the point. No Admiral, particularly one of Cunningham’s indomitable character, would have abandoned the troops on Crete and he was bound to attempt to get them off despite German air supremacy.

Admiral “Blinker” Hall’s remarks in the endnote (from his papers at the Churchill Archives Centre) relate solely to the failure of the Admiralty and Admiral Philips to understand the vulnerability of capital ships to attacks from the air, and to the latter sailing without any air cover. He was a great admirer of Andrew Cunningham.